Kind of being discussed here as well: What will happen to Must-Staple
Anyway, you are right on pretty much every point. But LE still feels that OCSP is unnecessary operational complexity. (I don't buy their privacy argument though, because any privacy problem is the fault of the end user clients / relying parties, not the CAs operating OCSP responders.)
Indeed, shutting down OCSP makes the privacy benefits of stapling -- and the possibility of automatic server-side detection of revoked certificates for the purposes of replacing them -- impossible. (And no, ARI is not a complete replacement either, because ARI does not tell you the specific information that a cert is being revoked, does not tell you why it was revoked, and only ... 2, I think? CAs currently implement ARI. My fear is that other CAs will continue to follow LE's lead and discontinue their OCSP services too, if LE can get away with it.)
It's all a distraction though. I think we should just leave revocation alone -- it's broken -- until cert lifetimes are shorter (< 7 days).